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Abstract
Recently, messaging applications, such as WhatsApp, have
been reportedly abused by misinformation campaigns, espe-
cially in Brazil and India. A notable form of abuse in What-
sApp relies on several manipulated images and memes con-
taining all kinds of fake stories. In this work, we performed an
extensive data collection from a large set of WhatsApp pub-
licly accessible groups and fact-checking agency websites.
This paper opens a novel dataset to the research community
containing fact-checked fake images shared through What-
sApp for two distinct scenarios known for the spread of fake
news on the platform: the 2018 Brazilian elections and the
2019 Indian elections.
Introduction
Digital platforms, including social media systems and mes-
saging applications, have become key environments for
news dissemination. Despite the numerous benefits that
these systems bring to our society, they have been re-
portedly abused by misinformation especially for politi-
cal purposes (Bessi and Ferrara 2016; Ribeiro et al. 2019;
Resende et al. 2019).
Election after election, we have seen different forms
of abuse and complex strategies of opinion manipulation
through the spread of misinformation. The 2016 presiden-
tial elections in the USA are still remembered for a ‘mis-
information war’ that happened mostly through Twitter and
Facebook. The notorious case involved an attempt of influ-
ence from Russia through targeting advertising (Ribeiro et
al. 2019). Similar attempts were observed during the 2018
Brazilian elections, where WhatsApp was abused to send out
misinformation campaigns, with large use of manipulated
images and memes containing all kinds of political attacks.
A recent study showed that 88% of the most popular im-
ages shared in the last month before the Brazilian elections
were fake or misleading (Tardaguila, Benevenuto, and Ortel-
lado 2018). In India, fake rumors spread through WhatsApp
were responsible for multiple cases of lynching and social
unrest (Arun 2019).
* This is a preprint version of an accepted paper on ICWSM’20.
Please, consider to cite the conference version instead of this one.
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of efforts related
to the problem of misinformation dissemination. One aims
at understanding the phenomenon and describing common
patterns and signatures of a fake news (Vosoughi, Roy, and
Aral 2018; Resende et al. 2019). The other consists of at-
tempts to provide a solution to mitigate the problem (Melo
et al. 2019). In both cases, a key challenge for researchers
in the field is the lack of public datasets containing fact-
checked content. The cost associated to build this kind of
dataset if huge, as it requires an investigation by experts and
journalists, who debunk the fake story usually by checking
out all facts and proofs regarding the topic. As an exam-
ple, Comprova, a large collaborative fact-checking initiative
from the First Draft News has brought together journalists
from 24 different Brazilian media companies and generated
146 reports from June to October 2018 (Wardle et al. 2019).
This work opens a novel dataset to the research com-
munity, consisting of two sets of 135 and 897 images con-
taining misinformation from Brazil and India, respectively.
These images circulated on hundreds of publicly accessible
WhatsApp groups1 around the 2018 Brazilian national elec-
tions and the 2019 Indian national elections, and were fact-
checked by well-known fact-checking agencies. The dataset
can be found in the following link: http://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.3779157. This data is based on a collection of mes-
sages shared on the monitored WhatsApp groups, along with
data gathered from fact-checking websites and manual ex-
pert annotation. We extract all images from both WhatsApp
and fact-checking websites, and matched them to build a
dataset that covers fact-checked images widely shared on
WhatsApp. This includes two distinct political scenarios
from Brazil, and India, where WhatsApp played an impor-
tant role during their respective elections2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We start by
surveying existing open datasets in the field. Then, we de-
scribe how we built our dataset, presenting its properties and
limitations. Finally, we conclude discussing potential appli-
1Whatsapp groups are made effectively publicly accessible
when group administrators openly share invitation links on the Web
and online social networks.
2https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/technology/whatsapp-
india-elections.html.
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cations and implications of our dataset.
Related Datasets
To make concrete contributions against misinformation, re-
searchers need a wide and broad set of datasets containing
labeled data, i.e., fact-checked content, covering different
topics and contexts (Hui et al. 2018; Nørregaard, Horne, and
Adalı 2019). In the particular context of misinformation dur-
ing election campaigns, data covering multiple elections is
also of interest to reveal potentially different properties or
reinforce common characteristics.
We executed a brief survey on existing public datasets
commonly used by prior studies on the phenomenon of fake
news, aiming at either understanding it or proposing solu-
tions to mitigate its effects. Those datasets usually contain
content labeled as fake or true stories. Such fact-checked
contents often appears in a range of different formats, such
as news articles, claims or quotes by celebrities, rumors, re-
ports, or images. They also cover different scenarios such as
wars and politics.
Table 1 summarizes some of the well-known fact-checked
datasets and their main characteristics, including a descrip-
tion, the total number of instances as well as their distribu-
tion by label (i.e. fact-checking verdict – true; fake; etc.) and
information about raters (i.e. fact-checkers). Note that we
colored in red the number of fact-checked instances labeled
as fake, in blue, the true news, and in black the remaining
ones (i.e. those that are neutral).
At a high-level, these datasets of fact-checked content
were labeled according to different scales, as either fake or
true by expert journalists, fact-checking websites, and indus-
try detectors10,
providing different pieces of information and contexts that
allow us to extract distinct types of features (Shu et al. 2017).
We also can note that, except for the dataset related to the
Syrian war, most of the related fake news datasets focus
on US political news, entertainment news, or satire articles
with extra information from traditional media like Twitter
and Facebook.
The dataset shared in this paper is complementary to those
described in Table 1, being unique for three main reasons.
Firstly, it covers fake news shared during the same type
of major event (i.e., elections) but in two different occa-
sions and contexts (i.e., the 2018 Brazilian elections and
the 2019 Indian elections). Thus, the dataset is not restricted
to the bias of a single event. Secondly, most currently pub-
licly available datasets are restricted to textual content. Mis-
information is not necessarily limited to text. Our dataset
adds, for the first time, image based misinformation to the
mix. Thirdly, our dataset contains not only the labeled fact-
checked images but also provides how such images were
shared on WhatsApp in the groups we monitored.
WhatsApp emerged as a key tool for spreading misin-
formation during the two analyzed elections. However, as
WhatsApp is an encrypted and very closed network, it is
hard to extract information on the misinformation dissem-
ination occurred through this messaging app. To the best of
10BS Detector: https://gitlab.com/bs-detector/bs-detector.
our knowledge, our dataset is the first of its kind to provide
such broad and diverse information about WhatsApp.
Dataset Construction
To gather fact-checked images shared on WhatsApp during
the Brazilian and Indian elections, the first step is collecting
the data from WhatsApp. To do that, we followed the ap-
proach used by (Garimella and Tyson 2018) and (Resende
et al. 2019) to get access to messages posted on WhatsApp
groups. Their approach joins a set of publicly accessible
groups and collects all messages (including text, images, au-
dios and videos) shared on the application. Figure 1 presents
an overview of our data collection process.
Given a set of invitation links to publicly accessible
groups on WhatsApp (Step 1), we automatically joined these
groups and saved all data coming from them. We selected
over 400 and 5,000 groups from Brazil and India, respec-
tively, dedicated to political discussions which we monitored
during the election period in these two countries, i.e. August
– November 2018 in Brazil, and October 2018 – June 2019
in India. We obtained invitation links to these groups by per-
forming selected queries related to each election on Google
search engine and Twitter.
In addition to exploring these groups which have been
shown to be quite widely used in Brazil and India (Lokniti
2018; Newman et al. 2019), we choose to filter only mes-
sages containing images. Previous efforts showed that im-
ages are the most frequent type of media content, as well
as an important source of misinformation (Resende et al.
2019). Also, images are harder to manipulate and can be
easily shared across groups and even platforms, unlike text,
which is much easier to change during dissemination. Thus,
we monitored the selected groups during 2.5 month around
each election (Step 2) and, for each message collected, we
filter out those containing images. This lead us to a set of
over 34K and 810K images shared by more than 17k and
63K users on Brazil and India from which we extracted the
following fields:
• group id: ID of the group the message was posted;
• user id: User ID11;
• image id: ID of the attached image file;
• cluster image name: similarity identifier between
images, i.e. all images with the same identifier – clus-
ter image name – are the same. We will show more de-
tails of this process in the following sections.
• timestamp: time record (i.e. date and hour) in which an
image was sent (timestamp format).
We emphasize that all sensitive information (i.e., group
names and phone numbers) were anonymized in order to en-
sure the privacy of users. The dataset only consists of images
that were publicly fact-checked and anonymized user/group
information. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, it does not
violate the WhatsApp terms of service.
11Note that we consider that these are, actually, phone numbers.
Hence, different numbers by the same person are mapped to differ-
ent identifiers.
Dataset Description Labels Raters # Instances
BuzzFace3
(Potthast et al. 2018; Santia and
Williams 2018)
News published on Facebook
from 9 agencies over a week
close to the 2016 U.S. election.
mostly false
(104), mixture
of true and false
(245), mostly
true (1669), no
factual (264)
Journalist
experts from
BuzzFeed.
2,282
Fact-Checked-Stat (Vlachos
and Riedel 2014)
Statements fact-checked from
popular fact-checking websites
labeled by journalists.
true (32), mostly
true (34) , half
true (68), mostly
false (37), false
(49), fiction (1)
Journalists
from fact-
checking
websites.
221
Fake-News-Net4 (Shu et al.
2017)
A repository for an ongoing
data collection project for fake
news research including news
content and social context fea-
tures with reliable group truth
fake news labels.
fake (211), real
(211)
Journalist
experts from
BuzzFeed and
fact-checkers
from Politi-
Fact.com.
422
Fake-Real-News5 News articles published during
2015-2016 along with their ti-
tles. The entire corpus is built
crawling real news with New
York Times6 and NPR7 APIs
and fake news from Kaggle
dataset items to ensure an uni-
form distribution of the samples
from both the classes.
fake (3,164), real
(3,171)
Journalists for
true news and
human annota-
tors from BS
Detector for
fake news.
6,335
Fake-Satire (Golbeck et al.
2018)
Dataset of fake news and satire
that are hand-coded, verified,
and, in the case of fake news,
include rebutting stories.
fake news (283),
satire (203)
Researchers
based on an
article from a
fact-checking
site or a piece
of information
that disproves a
claim.
486
FA-KES (Salem et al. 2019) A fake news dataset around the
Syrian war (i.e. reports on war
incidents that took place from
2011 to 2018.)
fake (378), true
(426)
Semi-
supervised
fact-checking
labeling ap-
proach.
804
Fake-Twitter-Science
(Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral
2018)
All of the verified true and
false news distributed on Twit-
ter from 2006 to 2017. The data
comprise ∼126,000 instances
(rumors cascades) tweeted by
∼3 million people more than
4.5 million times.
true (24,409),
false (82,605),
mixed (19,287)
Agreement
between fact-
checkers from
six independent
fact-checking
organizations.
126,301
Kaggle8 Text and metadata from fake
and biased news sources around
the web from BS Detector9.
bias (443), bs
(11,492), con-
spiracy (430),
fake (19), hate
(246), junksci
(102), satire
(146), state (121)
Human annota-
tors from BS
Detector.
12,997
LIAR (Wang 2017) Short statements from Politi-
Fact.com manually labeled.
half-true (2638),
false (2511),
mostly-true
(2466), barely-
true (2108), true
(2063), pants-fire
(1050)
Fact-checkers
from Politi-
Fact.com.
12,836
Table 1: Labeled datasets for fake news detection task.
Groups 
Identification WhatsApp
Data
Step 1
List of Fact-
Checking
Agencies
Strategy 1 Strategy 2
Selection and
Monitoring
Step 2
Misinformation
Identification
Step 3
Our
Dataset
Fact-
Checked
Images
Matching
Images
Search
Engines
Manual Expert
Labeling
Strategy 3
Figure 1: Overview of data collection.
In the next step, the images were clustered based on their
similarity using a perceptual hashing technique from Face-
book12 to group together all images that are visually sim-
ilar. This allows us to track the spread of an image (and
minor variants of the image) through multiple groups on
WhatsApp, including the time when an image was shared,
the user who shared it and the group where it was shared.
This is valuable information that allows us to assess not only
the popularity of individual images but also how it was dis-
seminated and its reach within the WhatsApp groups. It also
aids us in the next task to create a set of unique images that
need to be checked if they contain misinformation. Since all
the images in a cluster are visually similar, in our dataset,
we only provide one image representative for each cluster,
but we also include in the dataset additional information
about all occurrences of an individual image sent through
the groups.
Misinformation Identification
After tracking all images shared on WhatsApp and their
dissemination, the next step is to identify those contain-
ing misinformation. This step (Step 3) consists of identify-
ing, among the images that circulated on WhatsApp during
the monitored period, those that contained misinformation.
We accomplish this task through three distinct approaches:
(1) based on matching the images from WhatsApp to im-
ages that were already fact-checked by major online fact-
checking agencies in Brazil and India , (2) by making use of
search engines, and (3) by manual expert labeling. These
three complementary strategies help us to maximize the
chances of finding misinformation images.
12https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/tree/master/
hashing/pdq/
Matching with Fact-Checked Data. First, we crawled all
images which were fact-checked from popular fact-checking
websites from Brazil13 and India14. For each of the fact-
checking website, we developed a script to parse and save
all content and images that were fact-checked. For each post,
when explicitly available, we also obtain the verdict of the
fact check (fake or true).
In total, we collected over 100k fact-checked images from
Brazil and about 20k images from India.
Next, we matched this set of fact-checked images and
those circulating on WhatsApp using a perceptual hashing
approach that generates hashes to compare visually simi-
lar images. We used the state-of-the-art technique developed
and being used at Facebook: the PDQ hashing 15. This ap-
proach, an improvement over the commonly and broadly
used pHash (Zauner 2010), can detect near visually similar
images even if cropped differently or have small amounts of
text overlaid on them. Facebook PDQ hash produces a 256
bit hash string using a discrete cosine transformation algo-
rithm. We used the PDQ algorithm to compute the pairwise
match between each fact-checked image collected and each
image shared in our WhatsApp dataset. From all the images
that matched with fact-checking websites, we only retained
images that were labeled false by manually verifying the ver-
dict given by the website.
13aosfatos.org, www.e-farsas.com, veja.abril.com.br/blog/me-
engana-que-eu-posto/, g1.globo.com/e-ou-nao-e/, piaui.folha.uol.
com.br/lupa/, and www.boatos.org
14altnews.in,boomlive.in,smhoaxslayer.com,factchecker.
in,factly.in,fakenewscounter.com,check4spam.com
15https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/blob/master/
hashing/hashing.pdf
Search Engines. In our second strategy, we automated the
process of searching each image shared on the WhatsApp
groups on the Web by using the Reverse Google Image
search as proposed in (Resende et al. 2019). Given the search
results for an image, we checked whether any of the returned
pages belong to one of the main fact-checking domains from
Brazil and India, according to the previously defined set. If
so, as performed at the first strategy, we also parsed the fact-
checking page and automatically labeled the fact-checked
image as fake or true depending on how the image was la-
beled on the fact-checking page.
Manual Expert Labeling. Finally, we also asked three
journalists from India to label a sample of 2,500 images. The
journalists are experts in fact-checking and regularly report
on digital platforms. The 2,500 images consist: (i) a random
sample of 500 images taken from our 1.6 million images,
and (ii) a set of 2,000 most shared images from our data.
We sampled these two sets differently in order to get a sense
of the underlying distribution of misinformation in the rest
of the dataset. We built an annotation portal specifically for
the journalists to view and annotate the images. This gave
us 605 unique misinformation images. Note that this expert
labeling was done only for India.
As shown in Table 2 our final and shareable dataset con-
tains 135 distinct fact-checked images from Brazil and 897
distinct fact-checked from India. Those images were shared
by 919 different users in 184 different groups in Brazil and
by over 12,000 users on 2,662 groups in India, being shared
a total of 2,209 and 57,766 times in Brazil and India respec-
tively.
In addition to the dataset of misinformation images, we
also provide two sets of roughly similar size. (i) NOTMIS-
INFO: A set of images manually checked by the three anno-
tators to be true images. Note that this set of images mostly
contains highly shared images which are not misinforma-
tion, and (ii) RANDOM: A set of randomly sampled images
from all the images we collected. Together with the images,
we also provide details of users who shared them, groups in
which they were shared and when they were shared.
We need to observe that there are some limitations regard-
ing the data gathered in this work. We used 3 different strate-
gies in order to detect the most fact-checked images shared
on WhatsApp but it is possible that some images contain-
ing misinformation and included in our dataset had not been
checked by any of the fact-checking agencies used in this
work, or were not properly matched using the hashing tech-
nique. Thus, we cannot comment on the recall and the sam-
pling bias present in the dataset.
Moreover, the groups monitored here are just a portion
of the entire WhatsApp network. We cannot claim statistical
representativeness, as we do not have access to all groups on
WhatsApp. Still, to date, this is the largest sample of What-
sApp available for research.
We also believe that our dataset presents some strong ad-
vantages. First of all, it uses labels from fact-checking agen-
cies, thus relying on specialist labeling. Also, an image-
based dataset on fake news is not as common as a text-based
dataset. Furthermore, it covers an important context for stud-
ies on fake news around the world, namely elections, but it
consider two distinct scenarios, and thus is not restricted to
peculiarities of only one isolated event. Finally, the dataset
explores the context of the closed network of WhatsApp
and popular content circulated there. WhatsApp is becom-
ing very important to studies on fake news, especially in
Brazil and India, the countries which we gather data from.
However, it is a challenging task to get any data from this
encrypted messaging app due to the closed nature of its net-
work. Thus, this dataset can provide a useful resource in
understanding this phenomenon, especially in terms of the
dissemination process.
Conclusions
In this work, we present a novel dataset of fact-checked im-
ages shared in WhatsApp during the Brazilian and India
Elections can be useful for research in a variety of contexts.
Here, we present a few possibilities for research directions
using this dataset.
Better Comprehension of the misinformation landscape.
Countering misinformation is a typical adversarial fight. Ev-
ery election, misinformation campaigns explore new ways to
manipulate opinion and new defense mechanism are created
aiming at least to mitigate the misinformation campaigns. As
an example, the efforts that attempt to understand the abuse
of WhatsApp in the Brazilian elections have motivated coun-
termeasures deployed in the Spanish elections16 as well as
worldwide changes in WhatsApp to slow down the dissem-
ination of viral content17. By sharing our dataset, we hope
other researchers can provide a better and faster comprehen-
sion of the phenomena, triggering new countermeasures in
the upcoming elections.
Identification of Invariants. A key challenge to counter
fake news is to identify its patterns which remain unchanged
across contexts and dissemination environment. Our dataset
offers data from two countries abused by misinformation
campaigns inside WhatsApp, thus, offering novel contexts
and an unexplored dissemination environment for compar-
isons with, for example, the 2016 USA elections.
Development of Automatic Detection Tools. Our dataset
can be used as ground truth to incorporate strategies based
on machine learning algorithms to detect fake news automat-
ically. Fact-checked images may contain unique signals that
would allow one to automatically identify cases of manipu-
lated images. We hope our dataset might allow the studies in
this direction.
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